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ABSTRACT 
Previous researchers found that managers have conducted opportunistic earnings management 
(Abdolmohammadi et al., 2010; Crocker and Slemrod, 2007;Cornett et al., 2009; Jaggi et al., 2009). 
Corporate Governance (CG) is one of the instruments to overcome, or at least to minimize, earnings 
management. This research aims to provide empirical evidence about the effect of CG and earnings 
management on firm value, and the role of CG in the effect earnings management has on firm value. 
This research is needed, to explain the effectiveness of CG’s implementation by influencing earnings 
management, in order to lead to more efficient earnings management. 
This study uses national commercial banks’ data listed on the Indonesian Stock Exchange for the 
period 2006-2013. The research sample consists of 29 banks over an 8 year period, with a total of232 
observations. The research variable consists of the value of the firm, measured by Tobin’s Q as the 
dependent variable, real activity-based earnings management and accrual-based earnings 
management as the independent variables and corporate governance, measured by the CG index, as a 
moderating variable. 
The results show that the CG index has a robust relationship with performance, controlled by both 
the ownership concentration’s level and the size of the bank. Corporate governance has positive 
effects on firm value. The bigger the corporate governance disclosure score is, the higher the market 
value of the bank becomes. These results indicate that markets respond to the corporate governance’s 
disclosure, so the company’s market price increases. The results show that the CG index reinforces 
the positive influence of Accrual-based Earnings Management (AEM) and Real Earnings Management 
(REM) on the performance. These results indicate that corporate governance practices are able to 
steer earnings management away from the opportunistic and into the efficiency spectrum. 
Keywords: corporate governance, earnings management, firm value  
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Previous research has found that managers have 
conducted opportunistic earnings management 
(Abdolmohammadi et al., 2010; Crocker and 
Slemrod, 2007; Cornett et al., 2009; Jaggi et 
al.,2009). Therefore, it is important for 
companies to implement a Corporate 
Governance (CG) system to steer earnings 
management away from the opportunistic and 
into the efficiency spectrum. Earnings 
management is an accounting policy or action, 
chosen by a manager, to affect earnings to 
achieve certain goals (Scott, 2012). Earnings 
management is distinguished by its two 
perspectives, namely good and bad earnings 
management (Scott, 2012), or efficient and 
opportunistic earnings management (Gunny, 
2010; Cornett et al., 2009). 
Efficient earnings management is indicated 
by the increasing value of the firm, including an 
increase in its earnings’ persistence (Gunny, 
2010), so that earnings can be predicted, and 
they can become a signal for the improved 
quality of the earnings (Jara and López, 2011). 
Opportunistic earnings management is indicated 
by the increasing prosperity of the management, 
insiders, as well as the controlling share-
holder(s). Previous research proved the existence 
of opportunistic earnings management (i.e. 
Abdolmohammadi et al., 2010; Crocker and 
Slemrod, 2007; Cornett et al., 2009; Jaggi et al., 
2009). 
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Earnings management is often used by the 
management and insiders, as well as the 
controlling shareholders, to expropriate the costs 
of the other stakeholders. For example, the 
related-party sales of goods and services could 
be used opportunistically to manage earnings 
upwards in the pre-IPO period (Aharony, Wang 
and Yuan, 2010). They also provide evidence 
that such behavior may be motivated by the 
prospect of tunneling opportunities in the post-
IPO period, i.e., exploiting the economic 
resources from the minority shareholders for the 
benefit of the parent company (Aharony et al., 
2010). The salary rate of a manager (CEO) is 
based on earnings management, which means 
that the higher-paid managers, based on their 
financial performance, are less likely to report 
loan loss provisions while realizing greater 
profits from securities (Cornett et al.2009). 
Executives of Northern Telecom (NT) 
designed their company’s earnings to earn cash 
bonuses. They got a bonus of more than $50 
million in mid-2003 from NT, although in April 
2004 NT reported a decline in earnings, and 
sacked its chief executive. This incident at NT 
also shows how the miss-statement of financial 
statements can become costly for companies 
(Crocker and Slemrod, 2007). Opportunistic 
earnings management is done by an insider or 
the controlling shareholders to maximize their 
interests (Abdolmohammadi et al., 2010; Jaggi 
et al., 2009). Abdolmohammadi et al. (2010) 
found that the earnings management of family-
controlled companies in Norway was generally 
in decline, compared to that of non-family 
companies. However, the high-leverage condi-
tion of family companies shows a strong 
tendency to perform earnings management by 
increasing the earnings, compared to that of the 
non-family companies. 
The objective of CG is to protect the rights 
of stakeholders from their manager’s expro-
priation, and that of the insiders and controlling 
shareholders. This expropriation can be done 
with earnings management. Corporate gover-
nance is used to describe all of the influences 
affecting the processes for appointing those who 
decide how operational control is exercised to 
produce goods and services, and all the external 
influences affecting operations or the controllers 
(Turnbull, 2000). Based on these definitions, CG 
can be used to protect the rights of all the 
stakeholders from expropriation by managers, 
insiders, and controlling shareholders, through 
earnings management. Therefore, CG is 
expected to direct the earnings management 
from the opportunistic spectrum into the 
efficiency spectrum. What is CG’s role in 
strengthening the positive effect of earnings 
management on firm value? Can CG weaken the 
negative effect of earnings management on firm 
value? This research aims to answer these 
questions. The purpose of this research is to 
provide empirical evidence that: 1) CG and 
earnings management influence the value of a 
company; 2) that CG has a role in strengthening 
or weakening the effects of earnings 
management on firm value. 
This research is important because research 
about the role of CG in strengthening or 
weakening the effect on bank’s firm value has 
not received much attention from previous 
researchers. This research will be able to explain 
the effectiveness of CG’s implementation in 
influencing earnings management, in order to 
lead to efficient earnings management. Some 
previous research about earnings management in 
the banking industry has been conducted by 
Cohen et al. (2014) and Leventis and 
Dimitropoulos (2012). Before 2007, the 
increase of a potential higher stock market risk 
was caused by the banks aggressiveness on 
earnings management, by which financial crises 
are evaluated through large weekly stock price 
“crashes” and the pattern of full-year returns 
(Cohen et al., 2014). A study by Shen and 
Huang (2013) investigated how earnings 
management influences credit ratings, and thus 
the cost of debt, using bank data from 85 
countries. The results indicate that raters would 
downgrade the ratings when they perceived 
earnings management, after controlling for any 
other potential determinants of banks’ credit 
ratings, implying that earnings management 
increases borrowing costs (Shen and Huang, 
2013).  
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The research about corporate governance, 
expropriation, earnings management and the 
firm value of banks in Indonesia becomes an 
interesting study for several reasons: First, 
Indonesia represents a country with emerging 
markets and the best-practice mechanism of CG 
has not been as strong there as in developed 
countries. Second, phenomena indicating 
expropriation by the controlling shareholders 
were found in the Indonesian banking system in 
1998, when 16 banks were closed and seven 
banks were suspended, as well as the Bank 
Century scandal in 2008. These phenomena were 
supported by previous research, which found 
that expropriations by controlling shareholders 
existed (Claessens, Djankov, Fan, and Lang, 
1999; Faccio and Lang, 2002; Haw, Hu, Hwang, 
and Wu, 2004; Siregar, 2008; Achmad et all, 
2009). Third, the banking industry is one of the 
highly regulated industries, therefore, the banks 
should have CG best practices, lower 
expropriation by the controlling shareholders, 
and higher performance. Yet, some facts show 
that the phenomenon of expropriation by the 
controlling shareholder still exists in Indonesian 
banking. 
The theoretical contributions of this research 
are: 1) Adding to the literature on the role of CG 
in strengthening or weakening the effect of real 
and accrual earnings management in banks in 
Indonesia; 2) making the use of the corporate 
governance’s index measurement mandatory by 
regulation and voluntarily for the banks in 
Indonesia. The practical contributions are 
explained as follows: Earnings management is 
often used as a tool to conceal the private 
benefits received by managers, insiders, and the 
controlling shareholder (Cornett et al., 2009; 
Crocker and Slemrod, 2007; Sweeney, 1994; 
Defond and Jiambalvo, 1991; Abdolmohammadi 
et al., 2010; Jaggi et al., 2009; Prencipe et al., 
2008; Wright et al., 2006). Thus, research into 
the role of corporate governance in 
strengthening/weakening the influence of 
earnings management and the value of the 
company will help business practitioners, 
investors, financial analysts, and the Govern-
ment of Indonesia to evaluate the effectiveness 
of corporate governance in influencing earnings 
management practices, in order to enhance 
shareholders’ value. 
LITERATURE REVIEW  
1.  The Agency Theory  
The agency theory is based on the assumption 
that each of the parties involved in a contract 
wants to maximize their interests. In the 
companies with highly concentrated levels of 
ownership, the agency conflict might occur 
between the controlling shareholder and the non-
controlling shareholders (Almeida and 
Wolfenzon 2006; Claessens et al., 1999; 
Giovannini, 2010; La Porta et al., 1999; Morck 
and Yeung, 2003; Oswald et al., 2009;  
Villalonga and Amit, 2006). This agency 
conflict is known as a Type II agency conflict. 
 This research is based on the assumption in 
the agency theory that the agency conflict in the 
banking sector in Indonesia may occur between 
the controlling shareholders and non-controlling 
shareholders, customers, and the Financial 
Services Authority (Otoritas Jasa Keuangan), 
and the Deposit Insurance Agency (Lembaga 
Penjamin Simpanan). In the case of Bank 
Century, its controlling shareholders performed 
expropriation, while the losers were its 
customers and the government, which 
guaranteed the majority of the customer funds1. 
Therefore, this research involves two control 
variables, which are family control and non-
family control, in the relationship between 
earnings management, corporate governance and 
firm value. 
2.  Earnings Management and Firm Value 
“Earnings management is the choice made by a 
manager regarding the accounting policies, or 
                                                          
1 Bank Century was declared to be a failed bank on 20 
November 2008 (Investigation report of BPK 
No.64/LHP/XV/11/ 2009). Data from the police 
shows that the Bank Century lost 1.18 trillion 
rupiah.  Rp276.7 billion flowing to Robert Tantular, 
Rp248.44 billion to Anton Tantular and Rp853.971 
billion to Hartawan Alui. (Robert Tantular and 
Hartawan Alui are sons-in-law of Sukanta Tanudjaja 
(Vivanews.com, 2008). 
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actions that affect earnings, so as to achieve 
some specific earnings objective” (Scott, 2012). 
Earnings management can be conducted together 
with the accounting policy choices (Accruals 
Earnings Management/AEM) or the real activity 
(Real Earnings Management/REM). Examples 
of AEM are the choice of the depreciation or 
amortization methods, the timing of revenue 
recognition, warranty cost determinations, 
inventory valuations, and recognition of non-
recurring and extraordinary items. Examples of 
REM are the expenditure on advertizing, 
research and development costs, and fixed assets 
disposition expenses (Scott, 2012: 424). 
Earnings management can be opportunistic 
and efficient by its nature. Earnings management 
influences performance by its two perspectives: 
Positive and negative influences. This study 
suspects that earnings management based on real 
activities, e.g.: Freezing out and tunneling (of 
real earnings management) will negatively affect 
the performance, while earnings management 
based on accruals will positively influence 
performance. This is caused by the fact that the 
phenomenon of the ownership structure of 
Indonesian companies are concentrated, 
pyramid-like, cross-holding, and controlled by 
the family (Claessens et al., 2000; Fan and 
Wong, 2000; Lukviarman 2004; Siregar, 2006; 
Sanjaya, 2010; Surifah, 2011). Such ownership 
structures provide strong incentives for the 
controlling shareholders to expropriate the 
company's resources at the cost of the non-
controlling shareholders (Gilson andGordon 
2003, Villalonga and Amit, 2006), and this is 
associated with low performance and low firm 
value (Claessens et al., 2000; La Porta et al. 
2002; Zhu and Ma, 2009).  
Expropriation by the controlling share-
holders can be done in three ways (Gilson and 
Gordon, 2003): 1) Through the company's 
operating policies, such as salary expenses, its 
pension fund, bonuses, and not distributing 
dividends; 2) through a freezing-out, by selling 
shares at a cheaper price to companies in the 
controlling shareholders group; 3) through the 
company's contract policy (tunneling), such as 
an unreasonable transfer price, the transfer of 
assets from the company to the controlling 
shareholder at a cheaper price, or the use of 
company assets as collateral. 
These forms of expropriation cannot be 
manipulated by earnings management based on a 
discretionary accrual that is reversed2 between 
periods in the nature. Therefore a controlling 
shareholder would be more interested in using 
real earnings management to conceal permanent 
expropriations. Thus, it is reasonable to suspect 
that real earnings management is more 
opportunistic and will negatively affect the 
firm’s value. Real earnings management in this 
research consists of earnings management 
through interest expenses and discretionary 
expenses, therefore the hypotheses statements 
are as follows: 
H1.a.: Real earnings management through 
interest expenses has a negative 
relationship with firm value. 
H1.b.: Real earnings management through 
discretionary expenses has a negative 
relationship with firm value  
Conversely, if the controlling shareholders or 
managers are not motivated to do an 
expropriation, their information can be used to 
improve the efficiency of the contract. 
Therefore, if they are forced to perform earnings 
management, this earnings management will be 
used to provide flexibility for the managers or 
controlling shareholders to protect themselves, 
and for their company to anticipate unexpected 
events, so they do not inflict any financial loss to 
the parties involved in the contract (Scott, 2012). 
The type of earnings management which makes 
it possible to maximize the efficiency of the 
contract is accrual earnings management, 
                                                          
2 Earnings management was often proxy with a pure 
accounting decision such as change in accounting 
procedures (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986);  accrual 
accounting (McNichols and  Wilson, 1988), and 
abnormal accruals (Jones, 1991) which all inter-
period reversely. The use of sum of the years digit 
depreciation method leads to depreciation charge in 
the first year will be larger compared to the next 
periods. This means that expenses which are 
reported higher in the previous years will be 
reversed in the next years by reporting the smaller 
depreciation expenses. 
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because it is not a permanent one, and it will be 
inversed every time-period (Dechow, 1994; 
Jones, 1991; Scott, 2012). Earnings management 
is often used as a proxy by using pure 
accounting decisions, such as changes in 
abnormal accruals (Dechow, 1994; Jones, 1991), 
so that all of them are reversed between periods. 
Therefore, this research assumes that accruals 
earnings management will be a positive 
influence on firm value and the hypothesis 
would be as follows: 
H1.c: Accruals earnings management has a 
positive relationship with firm value. 
3.  The Influence of Corporate Governance on 
Performance 
Previous studies found that good governance has 
a positive effect on firm value and operating 
performance (Brown and Caylor, 2006; Durnev 
and Kim, 2005; Gompers et al., 2003; Klapper 
and Love, 2002; Rehman and Mangla, 2012). 
Corporate governance variables significantly 
influence a bank's performance in all the sectors, 
except for foreign banks (Rehman and Mangla, 
2012). Corporate governance scores relate 
positively to the value of Tobin’s Q (Brown and 
Caylor (2006)). The companies in the US that 
are more powerful at protecting the rights of 
their shareholders have a better operating 
performance and higher market value (Gompers 
et al., 2001). Good governance has a positive 
relationship with the market value and operating 
performance (Klapper and Love, 2002). The 
more transparent and better corporate 
governance ranked companies will be highly 
valued in the stock market (Durnev and Kim, 
2005). 
Corporate governance mechanisms, such as 
the size of the board of directors and the board 
of director’s independence have a positive 
relationship with a firm’s performance (Ibrahim 
and Samad, 2011). The independence of the 
board of directors from the firm’s founding 
family, and the financial interests of the 
members of the board of directors, have a 
positive impact on performance (Filatotchev et 
al., 2005). Based on previous research, this 
research suspected that corporate governance has 
a positive effect on the performance of banks 
listed on the Indonesian Stock Exchange. So: 
H2: Corporate governance has a positive 
relationship with firm value. 
4.   The Role of CG on The Effect Earnings 
Management has on Firm Value 
The banking industry is a highly regulated 
industry. The government, through Bank 
Indonesia, has established special regulations 
regarding the implementation of good corporate 
governance for banks (Peraturan BI No.8/14/PBI 
2006). In addition, Bank Indonesia also regulates 
the self-assessment of Good Corporate 
Governance (GCG) with the primary objective 
of improving the implementation of GCG by the 
banks (SE No.9/12/DPNP 2007). Some regu-
lations have been issued to protect stakeholders 
from the opportunistic behavior of management 
or controlling owners, i.e. regulations on the 
maximum limit for shareholding in commercial 
and Islamic banks (Peraturan BI No.14/6/PBI 
2012), lending limits for the commercial banks 
(Peraturan BI No.7/3/PBI 2005), and the fit-and-
proper test for the Islamic Banks (Peraturan BI 
No.14/6/PBI 2012). Any opportunistic behavior 
could create private benefits for some, to the cost 
of the other party, otherwise known as 
expropriation. 
Based on the above description, it can be 
summarized that: 1) various regulations have 
been issued by the Government of Indonesia to 
improve GCG, 2) the results of previous 
research find a strong positive relationship 
between good governance and operating 
performance and firm value (Rehman and 
Mangla, 2012; Brown and Caylor, 2006; 
Gompers et al., 2003; Klapper and Love, 2002; 
Durnev and Kim, 2005). Therefore, this research 
assumes that corporate governance directs 
opportunistic earnings management towards 
efficient earnings management, so earnings 
management has a positive effect on firm value. 
Therefore, this research assumes that CG can 
strengthen the positive effect, or weaken the 
negative effects, of earnings management on the 
firm value of the banks and the hypothesis can 
be stated as follows: 
56 Journal of Indonesian Economy and Business January 
H3: CG can strengthen the positive relationship, 
or weaken the negative relationship, of 
earnings management on firm value. 
RESEARCH METHOD 
1.  Data, Population and Research Sample  
This study uses the data on the national 
commercial banks listed on the Indonesian Stock 
Exchange, for the period from 2006 to 2013. The 
year 2006 was chosen as the beginning of the 
study, because the first regulation regarding the 
implementation of good corporate governance 
for commercial banks were issued in 2006, 
which was regulation number 8/14/PBI/2006. 
The end of the selected data period is 2013, 
because the data collection were done in March 
2015, so the latest data that could be obtained 
are data from the financial statements of 2013. 
The research data is secondary data obtained 
from the listed firms’ annual reports. Data from 
the financial statements and ownership details 
are obtained from the Indonesian banking 
directory and Bank Indonesia. This research uses 
purposive sampling. The criteria are that the 
firms produced annual reports and annual 
financial statements, and did not merge between 
the years 2006and 2013. Based on those criteria, 
the researcher could obtain a total sample of 29 
banks listed on the Indonesian Stock Exchange. 
2. The Research Variable and Measurement  
This research consists of a dependent variable, 
two independent variables, a moderating 
variable, and control variables. The dependent 
variable is the value of the bank (the firm value). 
The independent variables are earnings mana-
gement based on real activities and discretionary 
accruals. The moderation variable is corporate 
governance. The control variables are the 
family’s control, size and concentration of 
ownership. 
2.1. Firm Value  
The value of the bank (the firm value) is 
measured by the value of the bank or its firm 
value. Previous research has also measured firm 
values, using Tobin’s Q (Abbas and Rizwan, 
2007). The advantage of using Tobin’s Q is that 
the difficult problem of estimating the rate of 
return can be avoided. Moreover, for q to be 
meaningful, one needs accurate measures of both 
the market value and replacement cost of a firm's 
assets. It is usually possible to get an accurate 
estimate for the market value of a firm's assets, 
by summing the values of the securities that a 
firm has issued, such as stocks and bonds. It is 
much more difficult to obtain an estimate of the 
replacement costs of its assets, unless markets 
for used equipment exist (Abbas and Rizwan, 
2007).  
Tobin’s Q is the ratio of the total value of the 
securities of a company, such as its stocks and 
bonds, to the replacement value of its assets 
(Kim and Statman, 2012). Companies with high 
Tobin’s Q values are companies that are judged 
by investors to have a bright future. Tobin’s Q 
reflects the perception of a firm’s current and 
future profitability, in the eyes of investors (Kim 
and Statman, 2012). Tobin’s Q is the ratio of the 
market value to the replacement cost of the firm 
assets of the banks, which can be calculated as 
follows (Abbas and Rizwan, 2007): 
FV = ((MVE+ BVA) -BVE) / BVA 
Note: 
FV :  Firm Value (Tobin’s Q) 
MVE : Market value of equity is obtained from 
the number of shares outstanding 
multiplied by the stock market price per 
share. 
BVA : Book value of assets  
BVE : Book value of equity 
2.2. Earnings management  
Earnings management is measured with real 
activity-based and discretionary accrual-based 
earnings management. Real Earnings Manage-
ment (REM) is derived from the model of 
Roychowdhury (2006), and adapted for the 
banking business. Roychowdhury’s model 
(2006) uses three forms of REM, which are 
REM through the costs of production, REM 
through discretionary expenses, and REM 
through the cash flow from operations. This 
research uses only REM through interest and 
discretionary expenses. Interest expenses are the 
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main expenses in the banking business, while the 
discretionary expenses are expenses that are 
determined by management policies. Cash flow 
is used as a measure of REM, because an 
operating cash flow has an impact on the interest 
and discretionary expenses. In other words, if the 
interest and discretionary expenses are high, the 
cash flow from operations will be low, and vice 
versa. This research also uses the accrual 
earnings management specific to the banks 
(Beaver and Engel 1996),which was also used 
by Rahmawati (2006). 
2.3.Real Earnings Management  
Regression models, which were used to 
obtain the real earnings management, are as 
follows by Surifah (2014): 
𝐼𝐸𝑖𝑡
𝐴 𝑖𝑡−1
= 𝛼0 + 𝛼1 (
1
𝐴𝑖𝑡
) +  𝛽1 (
𝐼𝑅𝑖𝑡
𝐴𝑖𝑡−1
) + 
𝛽2 (
∆𝐼𝑅𝑖𝑡
𝐴𝑖𝑡−1
) + 𝛽3 (
∆𝐼𝑅𝑖𝑡−1
𝐴𝑖𝑡−1
) + 𝜀𝑖𝑡      (1) 
𝐷𝐸𝑖𝑡
𝐴𝑖𝑡
 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1 (
1
𝐴𝑖𝑡−1
) + 𝛽1 (
𝐼𝑅𝑖𝑡−1
𝐴𝑖𝑡−1
) + 𝜀𝑖𝑡  (2) 
Note:  
𝐼𝐸𝑖𝑡
𝐴 𝑖𝑡−1
 : Interest expenses of bank i in year t 
scaled by the total assets of bank i in 
year t-1. 
𝐷𝐸𝑖𝑡
𝐴𝑖𝑡
 : Discretionary expenses of bank i in 
year t scaled by the total assets of 
bank i in year t-1.. 
𝛼1 (
1
𝐴𝑖𝑡
) : Intercept scaled with the total assets 
of bank i in year t-1, thus the cash 
flow from operations does not have 
value 0 when the trading and lag 
trading value are 0. 
𝐼𝑅𝑖𝑡
𝐴𝑖𝑡−1
 : Interest revenue of bank i in year t 
scaled by the total assets of banki in 
year t-1 
∆𝐼𝑅𝑖𝑡
𝐴𝑖𝑡−1
 : Interest revenue of bank i in year t 
minus the interestrevenue of bank i in 
year t-1 scaled by the assets of bank i 
in year t-1 
𝜀𝑖𝑡  : Error term for bank i in the year t. 
 
The regression models in Equations 1 and 2 
are implemented by all the company samples 
(cross-sectional) for the entire period, because 
the number of banks listed on the Indonesian 
Stock Exchange is relatively small (with the 
number of samples only being 29 per year). The 
abnormal values for interest and discretionary 
expenses are not absolute, because the positive 
and negative values have different meanings. 
The banks’ interest expenses, as well as the 
discretionary expenses, are higher, compared to 
the industry average, as indicated by the 
appropriate positive value for each abnormal 
return. This indicates that the banks are less 
efficient. Some previous research that tests the 
real earnings management has also done the 
same thing (Roychowdhury, 2006; Gunny, 2010; 
Cohen et al., 2008; Hashemi and Rabiee, 2011). 
It is a general convention in the literature to 
include a scaled intercept, α1(1/Ait), when 
estimating non-discretionary accruals 
(Roychowdhury, 2006). This avoids a spurious 
correlation between scaled interest expenses and 
scaled interest revenues, due to variations in the 
scaling variable, total assets. The researcher also 
included an unscaled intercept, α0, to ensure that 
the mean abnormal interest expenses for every 
industry-year are zero. Including the intercepts 
allows the average IEit/At-1 for a particular 
industry year to be non-zero, even when the 
primary explanatory variables in the model, 
interest revenues and change-in-interest 
revenues, are zero (Roychowdhury, 2006). 
The regression result showed the normal 
interest expenses and the normal discretionary 
expenses. Real earnings management is obtained 
from the abnormal interest expenses and the 
abnormal discretionary expenses. The abnormal 
interest and discretionary expenses are calcu-
lated from the actual interest expenses, and the 
actual discretionary expenses are scaled by the 
total assets of the previous year, and are reduced 
by the normal of the interest and discretionary 
expenses. The normal of the interest and 
discretionary expenses is calculated by using the 
coefficient estimated from Equations 1 and 2. 
2.4. Accruals Earnings Management in the Bank 
Accrual earnings management used in this 
research is a special accrual model for banks 
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(Beaver and Engel, 1996) which was also used 
by Rahmawati (2006). Discretionary accruals are 
a proxy for earnings management. Total 
Accruals (TA), Non-Discretionary Accruals 
(NDA) and Discretionary Accrual (DA) are 
calculated by the following equations: 
TAit  = NDAit + DAit (3) 
TAit  = [α0  + α1COit + α2LOANit + 
α3NPAit + α4∆NPAit+1] + εit (4) 
DAit =  TAit − [α0  + α1COit + α2LOANit +
α3NPAit + α4∆NPAit+1 ] (5) 
Note:  
TAit  : Total accruals = balance of allowance 
for earning assets possible losses 
(saldo penyisihan penghapusan 
aktiva produktif ) of bank i in the 
year t. 
DAit : Discretionary accrual of bank i in 
year t. 
COit  : Loan charge–offs of bank i in year t . 
LOANit  : Outstanding loans of bank i in year t 
NPA : Non-performing assets consist of 
productive assets based on 
collectability levels: a) Specific 
oversight, b) sub-standard, c) 
doubtful, and d) loss. 
∆NPA : Difference in non-performing assets 
t+1 and non-performing assets t + all 
the variables deflated with the book 
value of equity plus provision for 
doubtful debt. Thus to calculate the 
accrual earnings management for the 
proxy: DAit =. TAit − NDAit 
NDAit : Non-discretionary accruals of bank i 
in year t. 
εit : DAit 
 
All the variables are deflated by the Gross 
Book Value (GBV), which is the equity book 
value plus the loans’ financial loss reserve (gross 
value). So, the discretionary accruals can also be 
an error term (divergence/residual value)of the 
Equation model 4 above, or DAit = TAit- NDAit. 
This research used the discretionary and non-
discretionary components of the provision for 
loan losses, because this account was the main 
accrual in the banking industry (Beaver and 
Engel, 1996). 
2.5. Corporate Governance Index 
Corporate governance is measured using the 
Corporate Governance Index (CGI). The CGI is 
obtained by calculating the scores of the CGI per 
the score of the maximum CGI. For example, a 
bank’s CGI score is 50, and the maximum score 
is 60. Its means that the implementation of CGI 
= (50/60) x 100% = 83.33% (See attachment 
about CG index). 
2.6. Control Variable 
The control variables of this study are family 
control, the level of ownerships’ concentration 
and firm size. The proxy of ownerships’ 
concentration is the largest shareholder, 
measured as the percentage of shares held by the 
largest owner3. This proxy was also used by 
Heugens et al. (2009), La Porta et al. (1999); 
and Jara and López (2011). This research uses 
such a proxy since the ownership of Indonesian 
banks is highly concentrated. About 93% of the 
owners have more than 30% of the shares in 
Indonesian banks (Surifah2014). Firm size is 
measured by the log of total assets. This proxy 
has also been used by Jara and López (2011); 
Maury (2006); and Haw et al., (2004).  
 The proxy of family control is either the 
dummy variable family or non-family. A bank is 
considered to be family-controlled if the largest 
shareholder is an individual or group of people, 
or if Bank Indonesia mentions that its ultimate 
shareholder is an individual or group of people. 
Non-family banks are split into three categories, 
which are: Non-family banks controlled by the 
government, non-family banks controlled by 
private institutions, and non-family banks 
controlled by foreign institutions. A bank 
becomes a controlled government bank if its 
biggest shareholder is the government. A bank 
becomes a private institution-controlled bank if 
the largest shareholders are private institutions. 
                                                          
3 The proxy of ownership concentration is the largest 
shareholder, since the ownership of Indonesian 
banks is highly concentrated. The ownership of less 
than 15% is about 0.14%, whereas ownership of 
between 15% to 30% is about 6.75%, and about 
93% of owners have more than 30% of the shares in 
Indonesian banks. 
2017 Surifah 59 
 
A bank becomes a foreign institution-controlled 
bank if its largest shareholder is a foreign 
institution. 
3.  Model Specification   
The model used panel data to test the 
hypotheses, utilizing a data multiple regression 
model, because the data are time series and 
cross-sectional. The procedure uses a 
Generalized Least Square (GLS) method. This 
procedure transforms the original variables in 
such a way that the transformed variables satisfy 
the assumptions of the classical model, and then 
applying OLS to them is known as the method 
for Generalized Least Squares (GLS). In short, 
GLS is OLS performed on the transformed 
variables that satisfies the standard least-squares’ 
assumptions. The estimators thus obtained are 
known as GLS estimators, and it is these 
estimators that are BLUE4 (Best Linear 
Unbiased Estimator) (Gujarati and Porter, 
2009).The research equation models used to test 
Hypotheses 1, 2, and 3 are as follows: 
FVit =  α + β1AEMit + β2CGIit + β3Famit +
β4Largestit + β5Size +ε (6) 
FVit =  α + β1RIEit + β2RDEit + β3 CGIit +
β4Famit + β5Largestit + β6Size +ε  (7) 
FVit  =  α + β1CGIit + β2CGIit
∗AEMit +
β3 Largestit + β4 Sizeit+ε (8) 
FVit  =  α + β1CGIit + β2CGIit
∗RIEit +
β3CGI
∗RDE +  β4Largestit + β5 
Sizeit+ε (9) 
 
Note: 
FVit : Firm value of bank i, in year t. 
AEMit : Accruals earnings management of 
bank i, in year t. 
                                                          
4 1. It is linear, that is, a linear function of a random 
variable, such as the dependent variable Y in the 
regression model.2. It is unbiased, that is, its 
average or expected value, E(ß2), is equal to the true 
value, ß2.3. It has minimum variance in the class of 
all such linear unbiased estimators; an unbiased 
estimator with the least variance is known as an 
efficient estimator (Gujarati and Porter 2009). 
RIEit : Real interest expense of bank i, in 
year t. 
RDEit : Real discretionary expenses of bank 
i, in year t. 
CGIit : Corporate governance index of bank 
i, in year t. 
Famit : Family control of bank i, in year t. 
The family control as an included 
group, and the non- family control 
as an excluded group.  
Largestit : The largest of shareholders of bank 
i, in year t. This is the proxy of 
ownership concentration.  
Sizeit : Size of the bank of bank i, in year t. 
= log total assets of bank i, in year t. 
4. The Research Model and Technique 
Analysis  
The research model is presented in Figure 1. The 
figure shows that the dependent variable of this 
research is the value of the bank, the inde-
pendent variable is earnings management and 
the moderation variable is corporate governance 
(see attachment about the CG index). 
     
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. The research model 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
1. Descriptive Statistics  
The results of the descriptive statistics indicate 
that the total number of observations is 232 
banks, which consists of 29 bank samples per 
year for 8 years. The number of banks controlled 
by a family comprises of 96 observations 
(41.37%), those controlled by the government 
are 37 observations (15.94%), those controlled 
by private institutions make up 71 observations 
(30.60%), and those controlled by foreign 
institution comprise 30 observations (12.93%). 
All variables have a deviation standard of less 
than 1 (one), which means there are no data 
outliers. 
 
Corporate Governance 
Earnings Management Firm Value 
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Table 1.a.  Descriptive statistics of the number 
of observation and percentage  
Variable N (%) 
Fam 96 41.37 
Gov 37 15.95 
Priv 71 30.60 
Forg 30 12.93 
Total N 232 100% 
Note:  
Fam : Family control (banks controlled by 
family),  
Gov : Government control,  
Priv : Private control,  
Forg : Foreign control.  
 
The level of the implementation of corporate 
governance is high at an average of 84.83%. 
This may be because the index for corporate 
governance is based on Indonesian government 
regulations for banking. The ownership structure 
is highly concentrated, since on average the 
largest share ownership is 59.72%. 
2.  The Effect of Real Earnings Management 
on Firm Value  
The results in Table 2 show that real earnings 
management through interest expenses does not 
have a relationship with firm value. These 
results remained consistent after the relationship 
was controlled by the controlling family, the 
concentration of ownership (largest) and the 
bank size. This result does not confirm the 
prediction; therefore, Hypothesis 1a is rejected. 
This is probably because RIE has not come to 
the market’s attention, so this is similar to a 
normal business practice, and it does not have a 
relationship with the market’s value of the bank.  
This result differs from previous research 
which have indicated that the phenomenon of the 
ownership structure of Indonesian companies is 
concentrated, pyramidal, cross-holding, and 
controlled by the family (Claessens et al., 2000; 
Fan and Wong, 2000; Lukviarman, 2004; 
Siregar, 2006; Sanjaya, 2010; Surifah, 2011). 
Such ownership structures provide strong 
incentives for controlling shareholders to 
expropriate funds (through real earnings 
management) toward the company's resources, at 
the cost of the non-controlling shareholders 
(Gilson andGordon, 2003 and Villalonga and 
Amit, 2006) and this is associated with low 
performance and low firm value (Claessens et 
al., 2000; La Porta et al., 2002; Zhu and Ma, 
2009). 
The results in Table 2 show that real 
earnings management through discretionary 
expenses has a positive relationship with the 
firm value. These results remained consistent 
after the relationship was controlled by the 
controlling family, the concentration of 
ownership (largest) and the bank size. This 
means that the greater the discretionary 
expenses, the greater the value of the bank on 
the market. These results do not confirm the 
prediction, so Hypothesis 1b is rejected. 
 
 
Table 1.b. Descriptive statistics of the research variables 
Variable N Min Max. Mean Std. Deviation 
CGI 232 61.67% 96.67% 85.19% 0.0701 
RIE  232 -55.26% 59.96% 02.26% 0.0639 
RDE 232 -13.58% 43.74% 04.75% 0.0425 
AEM 232 -27.20% 196.8% 02.76% 0.2115 
CGI*RIE 232 -11.92% 15.38% 02,40% 0.0294 
GCI*RDE 232 -10.19% 34.99% 00.40% 0.0341 
GCI*AEM 232 -22.28% 154.2% 00.03% 0.1704 
Largest 232 15.42% 100.0% 59.72% 0.2034 
Size (log total assets) 232 11.621 14.950 13.327 0.7741 
Note:  CGI: Corporate Governance Index, RIE: Real earnings management through interest expenses, RDE: 
Real earnings management through discretionary expenses, AEM: Accruals earnings management, 
Largest: Ownership concentration, Size: Size of bank.  
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Table 2. The effect of real earnings management and corporate governance on banks’ values 
Variable Coef. t-Stat. Prob. Coef. t-Stat. Prob. 
C 0.885 14.423 0.000 0.186 1.658 0.099 
CGI 0.219 3.041 0.003*** 0.219 3.365 0.001*** 
RIE -0.186 -1.036 0.301 0.127 0.726 0.469 
RDE 0.352 2.710 0.007*** 0.388 2.864 0.005*** 
FAM    0.001 0.057 0.955 
Largest    0.043 1.395 0.165 
Size    0.050 6.386 0.000*** 
R2 0.062 0.244 
Adj. R2 0.049 0.224 
F-Stat. 4.989 12.139 
Prob(F-Stat.) 0.002 0.000 
N 232 232 
Note: *,**, *** Indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively. CGI: Corporate Governance Index, 
RIE: Real earnings management through interest expenses, RDE: Real earnings management through discretionary 
expenses, FAM: Dummy variable – family control, Largest: Ownership concentration, Size: Size of the bank. Coef: 
Coefficient.  
 
This finding is probably caused by the 
utilization of RIE by the managers to attain 
benefits, so RIE has a positive relationship with 
firm value. This result is consistent with the 
results of previous research conducted by Gunny 
(2010) who found that Real Manipulation (RM) 
activities to just meet earnings benchmarks are 
positively associated with future performance, 
compared to firms that do not use RM and miss 
their earnings benchmark by more than 0.01. 
Firms that just meet their earnings benchmarks 
by engaging in Research and Development 
(R&D) or Selling, General and Administrative 
(SG & A) RM, have significantly higher 
subsequent industry-adjusted ROA than firms 
that do not engage in RM and just meet their 
earnings benchmarks (Gunny, 2010). In this 
setting, the results suggest earnings management 
via RM is not opportunistic, but consistent with 
managers attaining benefits that allow for better 
future performance or signaling (Gunny, 2010). 
Family control has no effect on the value of 
the banks. This result means that the market 
value of a family-controlled bank is not 
significantly different from that of a non-family 
bank. The level of ownership concentration does 
not have a relationship with the value of the 
banks, but the bank size has a positive effect on 
firm value. This result means that the bigger the 
bank is, the higher its market value will be. 
3.  The Effect of Accrual Earnings 
Management on Firm Value  
The results in Table 3 show that at the 5% 
significance level, Accruals Earnings Manage-
ment (AEM) does not have a relationship with 
firm value, but at the 10%significance level, 
AEM has a positive effect on firm value. This 
result means that the bigger the AEM is, the 
greater the value will be on the market. These 
results remained consistent after the relationship 
was controlled by the controlling family, the 
concentration of ownership (largest) and the 
bank size. These results are consistent with 
Hypothesis 1c which states that accrual earnings 
management has a positive relationship with 
performance. These results indicate that the 
market does not care whether the banks perform 
accrual earnings management or not. 
These results are consistent with the results 
of previous research conducted by Chang, Shen, 
and Fang (2008) who found that bank managers 
may use discretionary loan loss provisions to 
engage in earnings management when the non-
performing loans are at a high level. Yet, these 
results are inconsistent, with the results of 
previous research conducted by Wu et al. 
(2016). In their study, selected samples of 
ASEAN commercial banks from 2007 to 2014 
were used, and banking performance through 
profitability and managerial efficiencies were 
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analyzed. They found that loan loss provisions 
(as the proxy of earnings management) were 
negatively related to banking performance. The 
researcher suspects that this inconsistency is due 
to the difference in performance proxies. The 
researcher then used market performance, which 
is a firm’s value, whereas Wu et al. (2016) used 
financial performance. 
The results in Table 3 show that for the big 
sized banks, family control does not have a 
significant effect on firm value. This result also 
indicates that, for big sized banks, the market 
does not care whether the bank is controlled by a 
family or not. In contrast, for small sized banks, 
the market lacks confidence in them, therefore 
the size of bank has a relationship with the 
market value of a small bank and makes the 
market value lower than that of the non-family 
bank. The negative relationship of family control 
with the market’s firm value is insignificant 
when size is included as a control variable. 
4. The Relationship of Corporate Governance 
with Firm Value  
The results in Tables 2, 3, and 4show that CGI 
has a positive effects on firm value. These 
results remained consistent after the relationship 
was controlled by the controlling family, the 
concentration of ownership (largest) and the 
bank size. These results support hypothesis 2, 
which stated that corporate governance has a 
positive relationship with firm value. The higher 
the implementations of corporate governance 
are, the higher the market value of the bank is. 
These results confirm the previous research, 
which found that corporate governance has a 
positive relationship with the performance and 
the market value of the company (Rehman and 
Mangla, 2012; Brown and Caylor, 2006; 
Gompers et al., 2003; Klapper and Love, 2002; 
Durnev and Kim, 2005). These results indicate 
that the market responds to the disclosure of 
corporate governance, so the company's market 
price increases. 
5.  The Role of CG on the Effect of Accruals 
Earnings Management on Firm Value 
The results in Table 4 indicate that CG 
strengthens the positive influence of AEM on a 
bank’s value. These results are consistent with 
Hypothesis 3, which stated that CG can 
strengthen the positive relationship, or weaken 
the negative relationship, of earnings manage-
ment on firm value, therefore the third 
hypothesis is supported by the data. These 
results indicate that corporate governance 
practices are able to drive the earnings manage-
ment’s opportunistic spectrum toward the 
efficiency spectrum. 
Table 3. The effect of accruals earnings management and corporate governance on banks’ values 
Variable Coef. t-Stat. Prob. Coef. t-Stat. Prob. 
C 0.900 15.318 0.000 0.227 3.294 0.001 
CGI 0.201 2.822    0.005*** 0.192 3.477    0.001*** 
AEM 0.032 1.655 0.099* 0.031 1.715  0.088* 
FAM    0.001 0.064 0.949 
Largest    0.052 1.716 0.087* 
Size    0.048 9.734 0.000*** 
R2 0.035 0.217 
Adj. R2 0.027 0.199 
F-stat. 4.172 12.534 
Prob. (F-Stat.) 0.017 0.000 
N 232 232 
Note:  *, **, *** Indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively. CGI: Corporate Governance Index, 
AEM: Accruals Earnings Management, FAM: Dummy variable – family control, Largest: Ownership concentration, 
Size: Size of the bank.  
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These results are consistent with the results 
of previous research conducted by Nasution and 
Setiawan (2007), Leventis and Dimitropoulos 
(2012). Nasutian and Setiawan (2007) found that 
the corporate governance mechanisms, which are 
the size and composition of the boards of 
commissioners, and the existence of an audit 
committee, influenced the earnings management 
of public banks in Indonesia, which was detected 
by using the specific accrual model from Beaver 
and Engel (1996). They showed that mecha-
nisms done by a company have succeeded in 
minimizing the earnings management practices, 
and corporate governance mechanisms have 
worked effectively to increase companies’ 
performances (Nasution and Setiawan, 2007). 
Good corporate governance mechanisms should 
include a board of independent commissioners, 
an independent audit committee and managerial 
ownership, which all simultaneously can 
influence the earnings management in the 
banking industry (Rahmawati, 2013). She found 
that the board of independent commissioners 
negatively influenced the earnings management, 
while an independent audit committee and 
managerial ownership did not influence the 
earnings management. Banks with efficient 
corporate governance mechanisms report small 
positive incomes to a lesser extent than banks 
with weak governance efficiency. Also well-
governed banks engage less in aggressive 
earnings management behavior, through the 
use of discretionary loan loss provisions and 
realized security gains and losses (Leventis 
and Dimitropoulos, 2012). Yet, this research is 
different to that of Nasution and Setiawan 
(2007), Rahmawati (2013), and Leventis and 
Dimitropoulos (2012), in terms of its CG 
measurement research model. Therefore, this 
research is expected to contribute to real 
earnings management measurements. 
CONCLUSION 
The real earnings management does not have a 
relationship with firm value, so it does not 
support the initial predictions. These results are 
probably caused by, firstly, banks in Indonesia 
having already implemented best practice 
corporate governance, so that real earnings 
management is used in an attempt to maximize 
the value of the company's contracts. Secondly, 
investors do not pay attention to real earnings 
management; therefore real earnings manage-
ment does not have a negative relationship with 
the market value. These results differ from 
Surifah (2014) who found that REM has a 
negative relationship with the bank's financial 
performance. It is suspected that this incon-
sistency is due to the different performance 
proxies. This research uses market performance, 
which is the firm’s value, whereas Surifah 
(2014) used financial performance. 
Table 4. The role of CG on the effect of earnings management on firm value 
Variable Coef. t-Stat. Prob. Coef. t-Stat. Prob. 
C 0.377 3.952     0.000 0.300 3.160       0.002 
CGI 0.138 2.623 0.009*** 0.149 2.735 0.007*** 
CGI*AEM 0.066 1.803     0.073*    
CGI*RIE    0.213 1.849       0.066* 
CGI*RDE    0.531 3.561 0.001*** 
Largest 0.062 2.999 0.003*** 0.030 1.443       0.150 
Size 0.038 5.630 0.000*** 0.044 6.730 0.000*** 
R2 0.199 0.240 
Adj. R2 0.185 0.223 
F-Stat. 14.094 14.272 
Prob (F-Stat.) 0.000 0.000 
N 232 232 
Note:  *, **, *** Indicates significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively. CGI: Corporate Governance Iindex, 
AEM: Accruals Earnings Management, RIE: Real earnings management through interest expenses, RDE: Real 
earnings management through discretionary expenses, Largest: Ownership concentration, Size: Size of the bank.   
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The control variable of family control has no 
relationship with a bank's market value. This 
result means that the value of a family-controlled 
bank is not significantly different from that of a 
non-family-controlled bank. The level of 
concentration of ownership has no relationship 
with firm value. This result is also inconsistence 
with Surifah (2014) who found that family 
control and the level of ownership concentration 
have a negative effect on a bank's financial 
performance. The size of a bank has a positive 
relationship with firm value. This means that the 
bigger the bank is, the higher is its market value. 
Corporate governance has a positive 
relationship with firm value, when the relation-
ship is controlled by both the largest ownership 
and size. These results support the predictions. 
The higher the corporate governance disclosure 
score is, the higher is the firm value of the bank. 
These results confirm previous research, which 
found that corporate governance has a positive 
effect on the performance and market value of 
the company (Rehman and Mangla, 2012; 
Brown and Caylor, 2006; Gompers et al., 2003; 
Klapper and Love, 2002; Durnev and Kim, 
2005). These results indicate that the market 
responds to the disclosure of corporate 
governance, therefore the firm’s market price 
increases. The results also show that corporate 
governance strengthens the positive effect of 
accruals and real earnings management on firm 
value. These results indicate that corporate 
governance practices are able to drive earnings 
management from an opportunistic spectrum to 
an efficiency spectrum. 
This research has several limitations. First, 
this research does not separate between earnings 
from operations and the change in earnings from 
earnings management practices. Second, this 
research measures performance using a market 
approach. Third, this research does not involve 
the bank’s condition rating, since such data were 
not fully available. Based on those limitations, 
future research should start by using a more 
comprehensive performance measure, such as a 
balanced scorecard, and by considering other 
variables which affect a firm’s performance, 
such as a bank’s condition rating. 
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Attachment 1: 
Corporate Governance Bank Index 
No. Questions Scoring 
Board of Directors  
1 The number of independent directors is divided by all the board of directors 
(Peraturan_BI_No.8/14/PBI 2006). 
≥50% 1, 
< 50% 0 
2 The president director is independent (SE_No.9/12/DPNP 2007). Yes 1, no 0 
3 Accounting and financial competences of the independent board of 
directors(SE_No.9/12/DPNP 2007). 
Yes 1, no 0 
4 The number of people on the board of directors(SE_No.9/12/DPNP 2007). 3≥1. 3< 0 
5 The number of meetings of the board of directors(SE_No.9/12/DPNP 2007). 4≥1, < 4, 0 
6 Meeting presence of directors board (SE_No.9/12/DPNP 2007) ≥50%, 1, 
<50%, 0 
7 Is there a special meeting of the independent board of directors? (Ananchotikul 2007). Yes 1, no 0 
8 Board of Directors membershave 5% (five percent) or more of shares of the bank or other 
domestic and foreign banks or companies disclosed?(Peraturan_BI_No.8/14/PBI 2006). 
Yes 1, no 0 
9 Are Board of Directors members financial and family relationships to other board of 
director’s members, to management and/or controlling stockholder disclosed? 
Yes 1, no 0 
10 Are salary, honorarium, and aid for board members of directors disclosed? Yes 1, no 0 
Management 
11 The number of management members (SE_No.9/12/DPNP 2007). 3 ≥ 1.       
< 3= 0 
12 Bank-operating experience of most management members. 
 
5 years 1, ≤ 5 
years 0 
13 The management members individually or collectively own more than 25% (twenty five 
percent) of shares of deposited capital of other companies (SE_No.9/12/DPNP 2007)? 
No 1, yes 0 
14 Are the management members possession of5% (five percent or more) of shares of the bank 
or other domestic and foreign banks or companies disclosed? (Peraturan_BI_No.8/14/PBI 
2006) 
Yes 1, no 0 
15 Are remuneration and other facilities received by the management 
disclosed?(SE_No.9/12/DPNP 2007). 
Yes 1, no 0 
16 All members of management stated their financial and family relationships to board of 
directors members, to management members and/or to the controlling stockholder.  
Yes 1, no 0 
17 All members of management passed the fit and proper test and the BI approved 
them(SE_No.9/12/DPNP 2007). 
All passed 1, 
no 0 
18 The president director or managing director is independent from controlling stockholders, 
does not have financial, administrating, and family relationship to stockholders. 
Indept. 1, not 
indpt. 0 
Committees 
19 Is the auditing committee led by an independent person? (SE_No.9/12/DPNP 2007). Yes 1, No 0 
20 Is the presence of auditing committee meeting announced? (SE_No.9/12/DPNP 2007). Yes 1, no 0 
21 Are roles and responsibilities of committees clearly described? (SE_No.9/12/DPNP 2007). Yes 1, no 0 
22 Are independent auditing committees competent in accounting and financing and others 
competent in law and banking(SE_No.9/12/DPNP 2007)?  
Yes 1, no 0 
23 Members of independent auditing committees are independent directors?. Yes 1, no 0 
24 The number of independent auditing committee meetings per year (Ananchotikul 2007).  ≥12, 1 
.< 12 0 
25 Did the auditing committee monitor and evaluate the auditing plan and realization and the 
follow-up of the auditing result to judge internal controlling sufficiency and the process of 
financial report? (SE_No.9/12/DPNP 2007). 
Yes 1, no 0 
26 Is risk-monitoring committee led by an independent director? (SE_No.9/12/DPNP 2007). Yes 1, no 0 
27 Members of the risk monitoring committee are independent directors and 
independent?(SE_No.9/12/DPNP 2007). 
Yes 1, no 0 
28 Are the roles and responsibilities of risk monitoring committee clearly 
described?(SE_No.9/12/DPNP 2007). 
Yes 1, no 0 
29 Is the attendance at a meeting of risk monitoring committee announced? (Ananchotikul, 
2007). 
Yes 1, no 0 
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30 Is a member of independent risk-monitoring committee competent in accounting and 
financing and is another competent in risk managing? (SE_No.9/12/DPNP 2007). 
Yes 1, no 0 
31 Is the remunerating and nominating committee led by an independent person? 
(SE_No.9/12/DPNP 2007). 
Yes 1, no 0 
Yes 1, no 0 
32 Is the attendance at a meeting of remunerating and nominating committee announced? Yes 1, no 0 
33 Are the roles and responsibilities of remunerating and nominating committee clearly 
described?(SE_No.9/12/DPNP 2007). 
Yes 1, no 0 
34 Do the executives or members of remunerating committee understand a bank remunerating 
system? (SE_No.9/12/DPNP 2007). 
Yes 1, no 0,  
35 Do the executive members of nominating committee understand a bank nominating system 
and succession plan? (SE_No.9/12/DPNP 2007). 
Yes 1, no 0,  
36  Is CG committee led by an independent person? (Ananchotikul, 2007). Yes 1, no 0 
37 Are the roles and responsibilities of CG committee clearly described? (Ananchotikul, 2007) Yes 1, no 0 
38 Is the attendance ata meeting of CG committee announced? (Ananchotikul, 2007) Yes 1, no 0 
Controlling Issue: Does the bank publish controlling issues below? 
39 Organizational and environmental controlling. 
(Ananchotikul, 2007). 
Yes 1, no 0 
40 Risk management (SE_No.9/12/DPNP 2007). Yes 1, no 0 
41 Controlling management activity (Ananchotikul, 2007). Yes 1, no 0 
42 Monitoring and evaluating (Ananchotikul, 2007) Yes 1, no 0 
Stockholder’s rights 
43 Does the company carry out the annual RUPS(SE_No.9/12/DPNP 2007)? Yes 1, no 0 
44 Does the company send the letter of RUPS to stockholders a week before carrying out? Yes 1, no 0,  
45 Does the company impose one share-one vote? (Ramral, 2011). Yes 1, no 0 
46 Does the company disclose its dividend policy? (Ramral, 2011). Yes 1, no 0 
47 Does the bank explain the reason to determine the dividend at a certain level. Yes 1, no 0 
Announcement and Transparency 
48 Does the bank announce in detail its transactions with others affiliates? Yes 1, no 0 
49 Does the bank have a clearly written policy, system, and procedure on how to provide funds 
to related parties and provide large funding and monitoring and problem solving? 
 
Yes 1, no 0 
50 Does the bank disclose the company group structure? (Ananchotikul, 2007) Yes 1, no 0 
51 Does the bank disclose the stockholders structure? (Ananchotikul, 2007). Yes 1, no 0 
52 Does the bank disclose the organizational structure of company? (Ananchotikul, 2007). Yes 1, no 0 
53 Does the annual report explain the principles and realization of CG?.  Yes 1, no 0 
54 Does the bank announce the grouping of preferred stockholders of a family or an economic 
unit? (Ananchotikul, 2007). 
Yes 1, no 0 
55 Is there, in the managing director’s report, that he ensured, controlled, monitored, and 
decided the steps for the bank to impose the principle of carefulness according the BI’s rule 
and other prevalent laws including the bank’s commitment to the BI and other authorities?. 
Yes 1, no 0 
56 The bank has an internal auditing standard operating procedure (SPFAIB) 
(SE_No.9/12/DPNP 2007). 
Yes 1, no 0 
57 The bank made an internal auditing certificate(SE_No.9/12/DPNP 2007). Yes 1, no 0 
58 The bank made a task force for internal auditing and a manual for internal auditing 
(SE_No.9/12/DPNP 2007). 
Yes 1, no 0 
59 Is there a report of the bank’s realized internal auditing? (SE_No.9/12/DPNP 2007). Yes 1, no 0 
60 Auditor’s opinion (SE_No.9/12/DPNP 2007). Proper 1, 
others 0 
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